SIU 2026 · IEEE
When the instruction is Turkish, the robot doesn't get worse. It does something else.
Vision-Language-Action models map a camera image and a natural-language instruction straight to motor commands. Every open VLA is trained and benchmarked in English. We measured what happens when it isn't — 50 manipulation commands, two languages, frozen weights, 300 inferences.
0.372
Mean cosine similarity between English and Turkish action vectors. Individual tasks reach −0.33.
1.36
Cohen's d. A large effect by any convention, at p = 7.7 × 10−13.
Hasan Tatar 1,* Umut Gökmen 1 Ilgın Akkoyun 2 Sevcan Kahraman 1
1 Department of Computer Engineering, Istanbul Commerce University · 2 Department of Electrical Engineering, Yıldız Technical University · * Corresponding author
The finding
This is not graceful degradation. It is a representational break.
A mean L2 error of 0.501 on its own would suggest a weaker version of the right action — same intent, less conviction. The cosine similarity rules that reading out. At 0.372, with a minimum of −0.33, the model is not undershooting the target. It is pointing somewhere else. A magnitude error can be corrected with output gain. A direction error cannot.
0.501
± 0.464
Mean L2 error
Distance between the English and Turkish action vectors for the same task and the same image.
0.372
± 0.530
Mean cosine similarity
Direction, not magnitude. Below zero the arm travels the opposite way — 10 of 50 tasks do.
0.002
p = 0.981
Complexity correlation
Spearman ρ against instruction complexity. We expected long commands to fail more. They do not.
+30.8%
−0.2% latency
Tokenization overhead
Turkish costs 28.7 tokens against 21.9 for English, and no measurable time. The cost is semantic.
Method
Deliberately minimal, so the language is the only thing that changes.
01
One model, frozen
OpenVLA-7B at 4-bit NF4 precision on a single T4 (15.6 GB) via Modal serverless. SigLIP and DinoV2 feed a Llama 2 7B backbone that doubles as action decoder. One forward pass yields a 7-DoF vector: three translational, three rotational, one binary gripper state.
02
Fifty commands, two languages
Drawn from BridgeData V2 — 20 pick-and-place, 15 push, 15 orient — stratified across three complexity tiers. Translated by two native Turkish speakers with professional English, then adjudicated by a third reviewer for meaning drift. No machine translation.
03
Everything else held still
The same static 224 × 224 synthetic image for every prompt in both languages. Temperature fixed at 0.3. Three repetitions per language per task: 50 × 2 × 3 = 300 inferences. The only variable that moves is the language of the instruction.
04
Paired, then tested
L2 norm for overall divergence, cosine similarity for direction independent of magnitude. One-sample t-test against zero, Wilcoxon signed-rank as a nonparametric check, one-way ANOVA across categories, Spearman against complexity tier.
Translation quality was the one place we refused to economise. In manipulation, spatial postpositions carry the whole instruction: üstüne (onto) and yanına (next to) share a suffix pattern and differ only in their root — trivially easy for a surface-level translator to conflate, and 20 cm apart on a real tabletop. A machine-translated benchmark would have measured the translator, not the model.
Results
The model either understands the command, or it doesn't. There is little in between.
Every one of the 50 tasks, sorted by divergence. The distribution is bimodal: 14 tasks land under 0.1 and 12 sit above 0.9, leaving only 24 anywhere in the middle. For a deployed system this all-or-nothing profile is worse than uniform mediocrity — there is no confidence signal that separates the two ends.
| Task | L2 error | Cosine similarity | Category | Complexity |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| PP_008 | 0.042 | 0.999 | pick place | simple |
| PP_004 | 0.043 | -0.123 | pick place | simple |
| OR_002 | 0.043 | 0.999 | orient | simple |
| OR_011 | 0.050 | 0.999 | orient | complex |
| OR_006 | 0.052 | 0.998 | orient | medium |
| OR_014 | 0.058 | 0.998 | orient | complex |
| OR_003 | 0.065 | 0.997 | orient | simple |
| OR_005 | 0.066 | 0.997 | orient | simple |
| PP_002 | 0.075 | -0.122 | pick place | simple |
| PP_015 | 0.075 | 0.321 | pick place | complex |
| PP_010 | 0.077 | 0.997 | pick place | medium |
| PP_017 | 0.084 | 0.996 | pick place | complex |
| OR_015 | 0.085 | 0.996 | orient | complex |
| OR_009 | 0.094 | 0.995 | orient | medium |
| PU_012 | 0.101 | 0.994 | push | complex |
| PP_018 | 0.106 | -0.307 | pick place | complex |
| OR_010 | 0.149 | 0.986 | orient | medium |
| PP_014 | 0.364 | 0.667 | pick place | medium |
| PU_010 | 0.368 | 0.666 | push | medium |
| PU_006 | 0.369 | 0.674 | push | medium |
| PU_015 | 0.372 | 0.477 | push | complex |
| PP_007 | 0.377 | -0.332 | pick place | simple |
| PU_007 | 0.389 | 0.666 | push | medium |
| PU_001 | 0.396 | 0.638 | push | simple |
| PP_011 | 0.407 | 0.119 | pick place | medium |
| PU_013 | 0.410 | -0.300 | push | complex |
| PP_013 | 0.673 | 0.283 | pick place | medium |
| PP_009 | 0.676 | 0.321 | pick place | medium |
| PP_019 | 0.682 | 0.335 | pick place | complex |
| PP_020 | 0.686 | 0.334 | pick place | complex |
| PP_001 | 0.687 | 0.066 | pick place | simple |
| PU_002 | 0.690 | 0.379 | push | simple |
| PU_009 | 0.690 | 0.034 | push | medium |
| OR_007 | 0.695 | -0.056 | orient | medium |
| PU_008 | 0.695 | 0.312 | push | medium |
| PP_012 | 0.701 | 0.339 | pick place | medium |
| OR_001 | 0.712 | 0.371 | orient | simple |
| PU_003 | 0.720 | -0.157 | push | simple |
| OR_004 | 0.997 | 0.002 | orient | simple |
| PP_005 | 0.998 | 0.005 | pick place | simple |
| PU_004 | 0.998 | -0.001 | push | simple |
| PU_014 | 0.998 | 0.018 | push | complex |
| PP_016 | 0.999 | 0.003 | pick place | complex |
| OR_012 | 0.999 | 0.022 | orient | complex |
| OR_008 | 1.000 | -0.002 | orient | medium |
| OR_013 | 1.000 | 0.023 | orient | complex |
| PP_003 | 1.001 | 0.000 | pick place | simple |
| PP_006 | 1.003 | -0.019 | pick place | simple |
| PU_005 | 1.003 | 0.002 | push | simple |
| PU_011 | 1.006 | 0.010 | push | complex |
Push looks worse than orient, but the spread within each category covers nearly the full range. The ANOVA does not clear significance — no task type is reliably safer.
The result we did not expect. Two-word commands break as often as multi-clause ones — simple tasks score marginally worse. Whatever fails, it is not syntactic parsing.
Mechanism
The tokenizer does not just fragment Turkish. It inverts it.
Because complexity does not predict failure, the break cannot be in syntactic composition — it has to sit lower, at the level where subwords become meaning. Llama 2's byte-pair encoding was fitted on a corpus that is roughly 97% English. Handed an agglutinative language, it cuts in the wrong places, and one of those cuts is worth the whole result.
Turkish, "lift"
kaldır
After BPE
kal
"stay" — a standalone Turkish verb
dır
the remaining suffix
The leading fragment is not noise. kal is the Turkish word for stay — the opposite of the instruction. The model's first and strongest signal about what to do points the wrong way, and nothing downstream is positioned to correct it.
The same mechanism erases grammar. Turkish marks the direct object with the accusative suffix -ı, a single character that says which noun the action applies to. Split into an arbitrary byte pair, that cue is gone before the action decoder ever sees it — which is why the 30.8% token overhead matters even though it costs no time. Each extra fragment takes an attention slot and dilutes the signal at every position.
Why it matters
The upper cluster is the gripper bit.
The gripper dimension is binary — open or closed. Invert it and the L2 error saturates near 1.0, which is exactly what produces the upper cluster in the distribution above. On a real arm that is not a metric. It is a released payload mid-transfer, or a closed gripper driven into the table.
What makes this a safety problem rather than an accuracy problem is that the model is not uncertain when it happens. The failures are bimodal and confident, and the confidence signal does not separate the two modes. A deployed system has no way to know it has misread the instruction, and the standard monitoring layer — thresholding on model confidence — cannot see it either.
For robots operating where English is not the working language, cross-lingual adaptation is not a localisation feature. It is a precondition for safe deployment.
Ten languages, not one pair
Turkish is agglutinative. Isolating (Mandarin), fusional (Arabic), and polysynthetic languages should fail differently — or, if they do not, the flaw is architectural rather than morphological, which is the more consequential answer.
Translation layer against LoRA
The two candidate fixes have never been compared on safety. Upstream machine translation is cheap and breaks precisely on spatial postpositions. LoRA updates the embedding space directly but needs an unknown quantity of instruction–action pairs. Measure the trade-off.
A guardrail the policy cannot provide
Given the image, the instruction, and the emitted action, can a language model flag the mismatch before execution? Because these failures are confident, no calibration threshold catches them. An external checker is the only place left to look.
Limitations, stated plainly: one language pair, synthetic visual input rather than live camera feeds, and 4-bit NF4 quantisation throughout. Full-precision inference may move the numbers. Physical hardware validation is the next thing this work needs.
Related work
Other research
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